jetlib.sec » Tags » indiana-jones-4

Authors: Jesse Ou Rich Lundeen Travis Rhodes
Tags: web application XSS
Event: Chaos Communication Congress 28th (28C3) 2011
Abstract: Writing secure code is hard. Even when people do it basically right there are sometimes edge cases that can be exploited. Most the time writing code that works isn’t even the hard part, it’s keeping up with the changing attack techniques while still keeping an eye on all the old issues that can come back to bite you, straddling the ancient world of the 90’s RFCs and 2010’s HTML5 compatible browsers. A lot like how Indiana Jones bridges the ancient and the modern... Except for Indiana Jones 4. Let’s never talk about that again. Ever. Take Facebook, Office 365, Wordpress, Exchange, and Live. These are applications that had decent mitigations to standard threats, but they all had edge cases. Using a mix of old and new ingredients, we’ll provide a sampler plate of clickjacking protection bypasses, CSRF mitigation bypasses, "non-exploitable" XSS attacks that are suddenly exploitable and XML attacks where you can actually get a shell; and we'll talk about how to defend against these attacks. The best description is probably via the slides linked below. We've put a lot of effort into these, and they have video clips making the slide deck pretty big (why we're linking to it and not attaching it).

Tags:  xss video web travis-rhodes jesse-ou rich-lundeen indiana chaos-communication-congress indiana-jones-4 edge-cases  

Authors: Jesse Ou Rich Lundeen Travis Rhodes
Tags: web application XSS
Event: Chaos Communication Congress 28th (28C3) 2011
Abstract: Writing secure code is hard. Even when people do it basically right there are sometimes edge cases that can be exploited. Most the time writing code that works isn’t even the hard part, it’s keeping up with the changing attack techniques while still keeping an eye on all the old issues that can come back to bite you, straddling the ancient world of the 90’s RFCs and 2010’s HTML5 compatible browsers. A lot like how Indiana Jones bridges the ancient and the modern... Except for Indiana Jones 4. Let’s never talk about that again. Ever. Take Facebook, Office 365, Wordpress, Exchange, and Live. These are applications that had decent mitigations to standard threats, but they all had edge cases. Using a mix of old and new ingredients, we’ll provide a sampler plate of clickjacking protection bypasses, CSRF mitigation bypasses, "non-exploitable" XSS attacks that are suddenly exploitable and XML attacks where you can actually get a shell; and we'll talk about how to defend against these attacks. The best description is probably via the slides linked below. We've put a lot of effort into these, and they have video clips making the slide deck pretty big (why we're linking to it and not attaching it).

Tags:  xss code web travis-rhodes jesse-ou rich-lundeen indiana chaos-communication-congress indiana-jones-4 edge-cases  

Authors: Jesse Ou Rich Lundeen Travis Rhodes
Tags: web application XSS
Event: Chaos Communication Congress 28th (28C3) 2011
Abstract: Writing secure code is hard. Even when people do it basically right there are sometimes edge cases that can be exploited. Most the time writing code that works isn’t even the hard part, it’s keeping up with the changing attack techniques while still keeping an eye on all the old issues that can come back to bite you, straddling the ancient world of the 90’s RFCs and 2010’s HTML5 compatible browsers. A lot like how Indiana Jones bridges the ancient and the modern... Except for Indiana Jones 4. Let’s never talk about that again. Ever. Take Facebook, Office 365, Wordpress, Exchange, and Live. These are applications that had decent mitigations to standard threats, but they all had edge cases. Using a mix of old and new ingredients, we’ll provide a sampler plate of clickjacking protection bypasses, CSRF mitigation bypasses, "non-exploitable" XSS attacks that are suddenly exploitable and XML attacks where you can actually get a shell; and we'll talk about how to defend against these attacks. The best description is probably via the slides linked below. We've put a lot of effort into these, and they have video clips making the slide deck pretty big (why we're linking to it and not attaching it).

Tags:  xss code web travis-rhodes jesse-ou rich-lundeen indiana chaos-communication-congress indiana-jones-4 edge-cases  

Authors: Jesse Ou Rich Lundeen
Tags: web application cookie vulnerability XSS
Event: Black Hat Abu Dhabi 2011
Abstract: Writing secure code is hard. Even when people do it basically right there are sometimes edge cases that can be exploited. Most the time writing code that works isn't even the hard part, it's keeping up with the changing attack techniques while still keeping an eye on all the old issues that can come back to bite you, straddling the ancient world of the 90's RFCs and 2010's HTML5 compatible browsers. A lot like how Indiana Jones bridges the ancient and the modern... Except for Indiana Jones 4. Let's never talk about that again. Ever. Take Facebook, Office 365, MSN, and Wordpress. These are applications that had decent mitigations to standard threats, but they all had edge cases. Using a mix of old and new ingredients, we'll provide a sampler plate of clickjacking protection bypasses, CSRF mitigation bypasses, "non-exploitable" XSS attacks that are suddenly exploitable and XML attacks where you can actually get a shell; and we'll talk about how to defend against these attacks.

Tags:  xss code web jesse-ou rich-lundeen indiana abu-dhabi indiana-jones-4 edge-cases writing-secure-code  

Authors: Jesse Ou Rich Lundeen
Tags: web application cookie vulnerability XSS
Event: Black Hat Abu Dhabi 2011
Abstract: Writing secure code is hard. Even when people do it basically right there are sometimes edge cases that can be exploited. Most the time writing code that works isn't even the hard part, it's keeping up with the changing attack techniques while still keeping an eye on all the old issues that can come back to bite you, straddling the ancient world of the 90's RFCs and 2010's HTML5 compatible browsers. A lot like how Indiana Jones bridges the ancient and the modern... Except for Indiana Jones 4. Let's never talk about that again. Ever. Take Facebook, Office 365, MSN, and Wordpress. These are applications that had decent mitigations to standard threats, but they all had edge cases. Using a mix of old and new ingredients, we'll provide a sampler plate of clickjacking protection bypasses, CSRF mitigation bypasses, "non-exploitable" XSS attacks that are suddenly exploitable and XML attacks where you can actually get a shell; and we'll talk about how to defend against these attacks.

Tags:  xss code web jesse-ou rich-lundeen indiana abu-dhabi indiana-jones-4 edge-cases writing-secure-code