jetlib.sec » Tags » jean-philippe-aumasson

Authors: Jean-Philippe Aumasson
Tags: cryptography
Event: Black Hat Abu Dhabi 2011
Abstract: It is commonplace to argue that academic cryptanalysis---whose "attacks" literally take billions of years to complete---has no relevance whatsoever to actual security, for real-world failures of crypto are most often due to: Side-channel leakage (padding oracle attacks, etc.) Attacks on the implementation (key extraction through fault attacks, etc.) Complete bypass (after theft of keys à la DigiNotar, etc.) Nevertheless, a number of new cryptanalytic attacks have appeared these last years with various degrees of sophistication and of objectives, from complex key-recovery attacks to efficient-yet-cryptical "distinguishingers". To better understand the risk (or absence thereof), this talk will go through technical subtleties of state-of-the-art cryptanalysis research, which we'll illustrate with concrete field examples. The topics discussed include related-key attacks, cube attacks, the real security of AES, the case of pay-TV encryption, or the risk of using SHA-1, SHA-2, or the future SHA-3. Finally, we will present a recent attempt to bridge theory and practice, with an introduction to leakage-resilient cryptography.

Tags:  cryptography security risk jean-philippe-aumasson abu-dhabi bridge-theory cryptanalysis real-security  

Authors: Jean-Philippe Aumasson
Tags: cryptography
Event: Black Hat Abu Dhabi 2011
Abstract: It is commonplace to argue that academic cryptanalysis---whose "attacks" literally take billions of years to complete---has no relevance whatsoever to actual security, for real-world failures of crypto are most often due to: Side-channel leakage (padding oracle attacks, etc.) Attacks on the implementation (key extraction through fault attacks, etc.) Complete bypass (after theft of keys à la DigiNotar, etc.) Nevertheless, a number of new cryptanalytic attacks have appeared these last years with various degrees of sophistication and of objectives, from complex key-recovery attacks to efficient-yet-cryptical "distinguishingers". To better understand the risk (or absence thereof), this talk will go through technical subtleties of state-of-the-art cryptanalysis research, which we'll illustrate with concrete field examples. The topics discussed include related-key attacks, cube attacks, the real security of AES, the case of pay-TV encryption, or the risk of using SHA-1, SHA-2, or the future SHA-3. Finally, we will present a recent attempt to bridge theory and practice, with an introduction to leakage-resilient cryptography.

Tags:  cryptography security risk jean-philippe-aumasson abu-dhabi bridge-theory cryptanalysis real-security  

Authors: Jean-Philippe Aumasson
Tags: cryptography alghoritm
Event: Hashdays 2010
Abstract: After the AES Competition in the late 90s, the US NIST is now running a public competition to select the future cryptographic hash SHA-3. In this talk, we’ll present the motivations behind this initiative, with a focus on the only Swiss candidate BLAKE, which is one of the few candidates left in the competition. Then we’ll describe new results on one of the SHA-3 candidates, and we'll discuss the applicability of fault injection attacks to the HMAC construction. Finally, we’ll argue that SHA-3 is not the end of the road, since SHA-3 candidates are all software-oriented algorithms too demanding for constrainted environments, and we’ll present a proposal for a lightweight hash (previously presented at CHES 2010).

Tags:  competition state hash jean-philippe-aumasson 3-candidates fault-injection public-competition