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21:43
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SecDocs
Authors:
Sebastian Wolfgarten Tags:
privacy Event:
Chaos Communication Congress 23th (23C3) 2006 Abstract: This talk analyzes large-scale, countrywide Internet content filtering from a technical point of view and investigates the current situation in the People’s Republic of China. Additionally it discusses techniques to effectively defeat censorship and based on various tests conducted by the author, comments on their applicability in the Chinese part of the Internet. Nowadays the Internet has become an essential element of the world’s media landscape and our everyday lives. Thus for many people sending and receiving emails, chatting with friends, researching information or even purchasing goods online is almost as common as watching TV or listening to the radio. Interestingly without being further challenged it is generally taken for granted in the Western world that based on human rights, constitutions, legal systems and moral values, access to the Internet is provided freely, unlimited and most importantly unfiltered. But in reality the situation for millions of users world-wide is completely different: "Chat rooms monitored. Blogs deleted. Websites blocked. Search engines restricted. People imprisoned for simply posting and sharing information" [1]. In an attempt to create virtual frontiers in cyberspace countries such as China, Vietnam, Tunisia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria [1] have installed a multiplicity of technical and non-technical controls to censor the Internet and prevent their citizens from accessing or publishing information the government regards as illegal. Therewith these countries are denying essential human rights to their citizens and specifically violate article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" [2]. In order to gain a further understanding of the functionality and the extent of such censorship, this talk investigates large-scale, countrywide Internet content filtering from a technical point of view. Therefore at first it discusses various means of filtering a government might enforce to perform censoring. Next it investigates the current situation of Internet filtering in the People's Republic of China and presents the implications for Chinese users by providing concrete examples. Finally this presentation particularly highlights techniques to circumvent Internet censorship focusing on practical and easy to use solutions that are applicable in China.
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21:43
»
SecDocs
Authors:
Sebastian Wolfgarten Tags:
privacy Event:
Chaos Communication Congress 23th (23C3) 2006 Abstract: This talk analyzes large-scale, countrywide Internet content filtering from a technical point of view and investigates the current situation in the People’s Republic of China. Additionally it discusses techniques to effectively defeat censorship and based on various tests conducted by the author, comments on their applicability in the Chinese part of the Internet. Nowadays the Internet has become an essential element of the world’s media landscape and our everyday lives. Thus for many people sending and receiving emails, chatting with friends, researching information or even purchasing goods online is almost as common as watching TV or listening to the radio. Interestingly without being further challenged it is generally taken for granted in the Western world that based on human rights, constitutions, legal systems and moral values, access to the Internet is provided freely, unlimited and most importantly unfiltered. But in reality the situation for millions of users world-wide is completely different: "Chat rooms monitored. Blogs deleted. Websites blocked. Search engines restricted. People imprisoned for simply posting and sharing information" [1]. In an attempt to create virtual frontiers in cyberspace countries such as China, Vietnam, Tunisia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria [1] have installed a multiplicity of technical and non-technical controls to censor the Internet and prevent their citizens from accessing or publishing information the government regards as illegal. Therewith these countries are denying essential human rights to their citizens and specifically violate article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" [2]. In order to gain a further understanding of the functionality and the extent of such censorship, this talk investigates large-scale, countrywide Internet content filtering from a technical point of view. Therefore at first it discusses various means of filtering a government might enforce to perform censoring. Next it investigates the current situation of Internet filtering in the People's Republic of China and presents the implications for Chinese users by providing concrete examples. Finally this presentation particularly highlights techniques to circumvent Internet censorship focusing on practical and easy to use solutions that are applicable in China.
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21:43
»
SecDocs
Authors:
Sebastian Wolfgarten Tags:
privacy Event:
Chaos Communication Congress 23th (23C3) 2006 Abstract: This talk analyzes large-scale, countrywide Internet content filtering from a technical point of view and investigates the current situation in the People’s Republic of China. Additionally it discusses techniques to effectively defeat censorship and based on various tests conducted by the author, comments on their applicability in the Chinese part of the Internet. Nowadays the Internet has become an essential element of the world’s media landscape and our everyday lives. Thus for many people sending and receiving emails, chatting with friends, researching information or even purchasing goods online is almost as common as watching TV or listening to the radio. Interestingly without being further challenged it is generally taken for granted in the Western world that based on human rights, constitutions, legal systems and moral values, access to the Internet is provided freely, unlimited and most importantly unfiltered. But in reality the situation for millions of users world-wide is completely different: "Chat rooms monitored. Blogs deleted. Websites blocked. Search engines restricted. People imprisoned for simply posting and sharing information" [1]. In an attempt to create virtual frontiers in cyberspace countries such as China, Vietnam, Tunisia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria [1] have installed a multiplicity of technical and non-technical controls to censor the Internet and prevent their citizens from accessing or publishing information the government regards as illegal. Therewith these countries are denying essential human rights to their citizens and specifically violate article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" [2]. In order to gain a further understanding of the functionality and the extent of such censorship, this talk investigates large-scale, countrywide Internet content filtering from a technical point of view. Therefore at first it discusses various means of filtering a government might enforce to perform censoring. Next it investigates the current situation of Internet filtering in the People's Republic of China and presents the implications for Chinese users by providing concrete examples. Finally this presentation particularly highlights techniques to circumvent Internet censorship focusing on practical and easy to use solutions that are applicable in China.
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18:05
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Packet Storm Security Exploits
This Metasploit module exploits a vulnerability found in Adobe Flash Player. By supplying a corrupt .mp4 file loaded by Flash, it is possible to gain arbitrary remote code execution under the context of the user. This vulnerability has been exploited in the wild as part of the "Iran's Oil and Nuclear Situation.doc" phishing campaign.
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18:05
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Packet Storm Security Recent Files
This Metasploit module exploits a vulnerability found in Adobe Flash Player. By supplying a corrupt .mp4 file loaded by Flash, it is possible to gain arbitrary remote code execution under the context of the user. This vulnerability has been exploited in the wild as part of the "Iran's Oil and Nuclear Situation.doc" phishing campaign.
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18:05
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Packet Storm Security Misc. Files
This Metasploit module exploits a vulnerability found in Adobe Flash Player. By supplying a corrupt .mp4 file loaded by Flash, it is possible to gain arbitrary remote code execution under the context of the user. This vulnerability has been exploited in the wild as part of the "Iran's Oil and Nuclear Situation.doc" phishing campaign.
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21:06
»
SecDocs
Authors:
Roger Dingledine Tags:
Tor privacy Event:
Chaos Communication Congress 26th (26C3) 2009 Abstract: Tor was originally designed as a civil liberties tool for people in the West. But if governments can block connections *to* the Tor network, who cares that it provides great anonymity? A few years ago we started adapting Tor to be more robust in countries like China. We streamlined its network communications to look more like ordinary SSL, and we introduced "bridge relays" that are harder for an attacker to find and block than Tor's public relays. In the aftermath of the Iranian elections in June, and then the late September blockings in China, we've learned a lot about how circumvention tools work in reality for activists in tough situations. I'll give an overview of the Tor architecture, and summarize the variety of people who use it and what security it provides. Then we'll focus on the use of tools like Tor in countries like Iran and China: why anonymity is important for circumvention, why transparency in design and operation is critical for trust, the role of popular media in helping – and harming – the effectiveness of the tools, and tradeoffs between usability and security. After describing Tor's strategy for secure circumvention (what we thought would work), I'll talk about how the arms race actually seems to be going in practice.
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21:06
»
SecDocs
Authors:
Roger Dingledine Tags:
Tor privacy Event:
Chaos Communication Congress 26th (26C3) 2009 Abstract: Tor was originally designed as a civil liberties tool for people in the West. But if governments can block connections *to* the Tor network, who cares that it provides great anonymity? A few years ago we started adapting Tor to be more robust in countries like China. We streamlined its network communications to look more like ordinary SSL, and we introduced "bridge relays" that are harder for an attacker to find and block than Tor's public relays. In the aftermath of the Iranian elections in June, and then the late September blockings in China, we've learned a lot about how circumvention tools work in reality for activists in tough situations. I'll give an overview of the Tor architecture, and summarize the variety of people who use it and what security it provides. Then we'll focus on the use of tools like Tor in countries like Iran and China: why anonymity is important for circumvention, why transparency in design and operation is critical for trust, the role of popular media in helping – and harming – the effectiveness of the tools, and tradeoffs between usability and security. After describing Tor's strategy for secure circumvention (what we thought would work), I'll talk about how the arms race actually seems to be going in practice.